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PAYING FOR WHAT YOU GET AND
GETTING WHAT YOU PAY FOR: LEGAL
RESPONSES TO CONSUMER-DRIVEN
HEALTH CARE
MARK A. HALL*
I
INTRODUCTION
In a tour de force, Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman advance the bold
and sweeping thesis that health care law and policy systematically favor those
who are relatively well-off to the detriment of the less fortunate, especially
lower-income payers of health insurance premiums.1
Surprisingly, this
regressivity can be seen both in market-oriented features of public policy as
well as in many policies that seem on first appearance to be more progressive in
spirit. Most disturbing is the realization that the current system is not only
regressive in many ways, but it is perversely or doubly so in the sense that lowerincome working people with more or less standard health coverage are (1)
contributing disproportionate shares of their incomes to pay for more and
better-quality health care than most of them would reasonably choose to buy if
given a choice with costs in view, and (2) getting less benefit from their
insurance coverage than are their more fortunate coworkers, despite paying the
same premiums. Thus, social inequity exists both in what people pay and in
what they receive.
Recognition of these inequities should galvanize policy analysts from all
parts of the socio-political spectrum to re-examine both the current situation
and their favored reforms, with an eye toward determining which features
exacerbate or ameliorate these distributive injustices. Some objectionable
features may be unavoidable, others may be regressive only from a perspective
that presupposes ideal alternatives that are unrealistic, whereas others may be
rectifiable in some fashion. In short, observing the distributive features of
health care delivery and finance is a critical starting point for deeper
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understanding, but this does little to determine what can and should be changed
and how.
Nevertheless, change is inevitable. It is seemingly the only constant in
health care financing over the past fifty years. During that time, health
insurance surfaced and spread. It became more and more generous and
unaffordable, and was eventually followed by managed-care restrictions on
patients’ choice of physicians and their choice of treatments, which produced
widespread backlash and so was neutered. As inflation in health care spending
continues apace, the current trend is “consumer-driven health care” (CDHC).
In various forms, it requires insured patients to pay a major—or the entire—
portion of their own medical costs out-of-pocket or from a designated savings
account.2 The most visible signs of this intensifying consumerism are the
generously tax-sheltered “health savings accounts” (HSAs) authorized by
recent federal legislation.3 HSAs can be used to pay for medical costs not
covered by insurance if they are linked with “catastrophic” insurance policies
that have annual deductibles in the range of $1000 to $10,000.4
HSAs and other forms of patient cost-sharing embrace a much more
explicitly tiered approach to health care finance and delivery.
These
innovations therefore represent at least one version of the more differentiated
coverage that Havighurst and Richman would apparently like to see. Under the
deeply tiered approach they favor, rather than requiring everyone to contribute
roughly equal amounts for essentially identical coverage—which in fact is less
valuable to some than to others—people would purchase and pay for the level
of care they actually receive, at widely varying levels of value and cost. 5 To
invoke an oft-used metaphor, instead of requiring everyone to pay for a
Cadillac while some drive only a Corolla, each would more or less pay for what
he or she drives. Ideally, public or employer subsidies would enable everyone

2. See generally CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS
POLICY MAKERS (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004) (providing extensive overview of consumerdriven health care policies); James C. Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era,
291 JAMA 1880 (2004) (same); Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health
Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777 (2006) (analyzing the claims made by proponents of consumer-driven
health care).
3. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 § 1201, 26
U.S.C.A. § 223 (2003).
4. Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the
Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 536, 551–52 (2005); Edward J. Larson & Marc
Dettmann, The Impact of HSAs on Health Care Reform: Preliminary Results After One Year, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1097 (2006). These numbers are not precise because they are adjusted each year
for inflation.
5. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 79 (supporting “proposals to let consumers . . .
choose more or less freely the style of health care they want to purchase for their families”). To the
surprise of many, they are also amenable to a single-payer government insurance system. See id.
(“Indeed, we would not object if our [arguments] . . . were cited as a reason to adopt a monolithic
national health program.”). Still, they insist that those who are well-off remain free to purchase
supplemental coverage that provides a higher tier of service. See id. (expressing openness to “scrapping
private health insurance altogether (except insofar as it might supplement the national system’s
coverage)”).
AND
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to afford some form of safe and decent transportation, but some people may
ride the bus or choose mini-scooters while others are willing to pay more to
enjoy luxury vehicles.
This article surveys a partial range of legal and regulatory issues that might
arise if this scenario were realized. The focus here is on the private-law issues
of contract and tort and on the regulation of private insurance.6 Part II
considers whether cross-subsidies in providers’ prices and insurance premiums
are properly viewed as regressive or progressive and surveys possible legal
barriers to either reducing or increasing these cross-subsidies. Part III considers
whether either contract or tort law requires providers to deliver more health
care than people are actually willing to pay for. In the end, this brief survey
concludes that neither existing insurance regulatory policy nor common-law
precedents pose major obstacles to consumer-driven health care.
II
LESS REGRESSIVE HEALTH CARE FINANCING
Private-sector payment for medical services might be made more
progressive in two broad ways. Either providers could adjust their prices to
reflect patients’ ability to pay or health insurance premiums could reflect
patients’ income in some fashion. This section explores various versions of each
possibility.
A. Providers’ Prices
Havighurst and Richman focus principally on perceived injustices to
premium payers, failing to discuss what many people otherwise regard as the
primary redistributive mechanism in payment for health care—discriminatory
pricing by hospitals. Instead of accepting the conventional view that hospitals
engage in Robin Hood-style redistribution from those with greater ability to
pay to those with less, they argue that the system is essentially regressive
because “ability to pay” is most often a function of having private health
insurance—a variable not closely correlated with individual income or wealth.7
Thus, they contend that most of the cost of hospitals’ good works, however
worthy they may be—something they are unwilling to concede—are ultimately
borne more or less equally by premium payers, like a regressive “head tax” that
is imposed without regard to relative ability to pay.8 Many readers, accustomed
to viewing hospital cross-subsidies as distributionally progressive, will find this
argument hard to swallow. However, despite its unconventionality—and
6. Others in this symposium consider public insurance and government regulation of providers.
See, e.g., Christopher J. Conover, Distributional Considerations in the Overregulation of Health
Professionals, Health Facilities, and Health Plans, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181 (Autumn 2006);
Jonathan Oberlander, The Political Economy of Unfairness in U.S. Health Policy, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 245 (Autumn 2006).
7. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 28.
8. Id.
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indeed because of this quality—the Havighurst–Richman hypothesis deserves
to be taken seriously.
Nevertheless, in concentrating on what they see as hospitals’ ability to
overcharge insured patients, Havighurst and Richman give very little attention
to another regressive feature of modern health care finance—namely, that
hospitals routinely charge uninsured patients considerably more than insured
patients for exactly the same services. Rather than inflate prices by roughly the
same amount for all paying patients, hospitals instead charge their well-insured
patients prices that are closer to their actual costs and load a great deal more of
the burden of cross-subsidies on the smaller portion of patients who are without
insurance or who are seeking care outside their health plan’s network.9 The
magnitude of price discrimination against these disadvantaged patients can be
staggering, with their bills amounting to several times what insurers pay on
behalf of their subscribers for identical care.10
These bizarre pricing practices result from a combination of market and
regulatory factors.11 Although a full analysis is too complex to undertake here,
the net result appears to be a perversely regressive pricing system that charges
much more, not the same or less, to those who, because they lack insurance, are
far less able to pay for hospital services. This unfairness receives only passing
notice by Havighurst and Richman, yet it would seem to be one they should
decry as much as they decry the unfairness of the public-good burden imposed
on insured patients.12 Instead, Havighurst and Richman, contending that many
uninsured are “uninsured by choice” and have “more money in their pockets”
by virtue of not paying insurance premiums,13 seem bent on focusing attention
away from the uninsured and on emphasizing the share of the public-good
burden that falls on the working middle and lower-middle classes. This focus
leaves the particular plight of unavoidably uninsured patients as a matter
needing further discussion in this symposium.
The legal legitimacy of price discrimination against the uninsured is being
attacked in class action lawsuits across the country that accuse tax-exempt
hospitals of failing to live up to their charitable missions. So far, most of these

9. Christopher P. Tompkins, Stuart H. Altman & Efrat Eilat, The Precarious Pricing System for
Hospital Services, 25 HEALTH AFF. 45, 52 (2006).
10. Kenneth T. Bowden, Determining a Reasonable Price for Health Care in the United States: Is
This Possible?, 34 BRIEF 26, 28 (2005); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos
Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 62 (2006); Julie Appleby, Hospitals Sock Uninsured with
Much Bigger Bills, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2004, at B1; Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2004, at B1.
11. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 13–82. These factors include the following: (1) the
charitable mission of most nonprofit hospitals, which encourages them to support various collective
goods, (2) the ability of public and private insurers to insist on deep discounts that eliminate pricing
support for collective goods, and (3) hospitals’ market power over the uninsured. Also relevant are
regulatory barriers to hospitals regularly offering non-negotiated price discounts.
12. See id. at 71–72.
13. Id. at 72.
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suits have been dismissed on procedural or technical grounds,14 but some early
rulings have recognized a valid claim in allegations that hospitals charge
uninsured patients a lot more than insured patients.15 Additional support for
attacking hospital price discrimination comes from litigation between insurers
and hospitals under managed care plans. When a hospital treats patients
covered by insurers with whom it does not have a contract, courts have ruled
that the hospital cannot charge its full list prices but instead must give a
discount that reflects what that hospital usually is paid.16 Under the pressure of
this litigation, public scrutiny, and congressional hearings, hospitals are rapidly
changing their billing practices and adopting sliding-scale charge systems that
give lower-income, uninsured patients roughly the same level of discounts as
insured patients.17
Charging each patient roughly equal amounts for equal care would solve the
perverse regressivity of current hospital pricing, but it would not restore the
progressivity that once prevailed. Starting as far back as the Code of
Hammurabi18 and until about fifty years ago, health care providers were
required to explicitly subsidize services for poor patients. Under ancient
Roman law and in Renaissance England, physicians,19 like barristers,20 were
14. For instance, federal courts have refused to certify a class, have found an absence of any federal
cause of action, or have declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law breach-of-contract claims.
Moreover, courts have dismissed some contract claims on res judicata grounds when the claim was
previously settled through normal collection processes. Richard G. Stuhan, Decisions to Date on
Dispositive Motions in the Charity Care Litigation, HEALTH LAWYER NEWS, Sept. 2005, at 18.
15. Id.
16. Temple Univ. Hosp. v. Healthcare Management Alternatives, 832 A.2d 501, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003); River Park Hosp. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tenn., 173 S.W.3d 43, 58 (Tenn. 2003).
17. Bowden, supra note 10, at 29; Reinhardt, supra note 10, at 62; Tomkins, Altman & Eilat, supra
note 9, at 53.
18. Enacted about 2030 B. C., the Code of Hammurabi declared, for instance:
If a doctor has cured the shattered limb of a gentleman or has cured the diseased bowel, the
patient shall give five shekels of silver to the doctor. If it is the son of a poor man he shall give
three shekels of silver. If a gentleman’s servant, the master of the slave shall give two shekels
of silver to the doctor.
Hubert W. Smith, Legal Responsibility for Medical Malpractice, 116 JAMA 942, 943 (1941). It is not
entirely clear, though, whether these rules were based on ability to pay rather than on the social value
of the service to different classes of patients.
19. The historical and legal bases for barring physicians from suing for fees has not been studied as
thoroughly as it has been for lawyers. For physicians, the best scholarly discussion is well over a
century old. JOHN ORDRONAUX, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDICINE IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS, TORTS, AND EVIDENCE 10–14, 34–41 (Arno Press 1973) (1869). It appears that
medieval Roman law codified the ancient practice based in part on concerns that physicians were
overcharging their patients. THOMAS PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS: OR A CODE OF INSTITUTES AND
PRECEPTS ADAPTED TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 175–76
(Birmingham: Classics of Medicine 1985) (1803). In Renaissance England, the rule appears to be based
more on the notion of legal recognition of professional norms, that is, refusing to find an implied
promise to pay when the common practice at the time was to receive honoraria. However, it seems
there was no rule barring physicians from making and enforcing an express contract. Id. at 177–78;
Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191, 237 (Lord Morris), 280 (Lord Upjohn) (H.L. 1967) (appeal taken
from Eng.), overruled by Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, (2000) 3 Eng. Rep. 673 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Scot.).
20. In ancient Rome, lawyers and other “liberal arts” practitioners from the nobility undertook
service pursuant to a “mandate,” meaning that their services were required without compensation.
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legally precluded from enforcing ordinary contracts for their fees because this
was seen as inconsistent with their status as noble, learned professionals.
Instead, physicians and barristers received voluntary honoraria21 and were
expected to serve patients regardless of their ability to pay.22
This honorarium or non-contractual doctrine was never adopted in the
United States, where medical and legal services have always had a contractual
legal status.23 However, an explicitly progressive pricing practice was required
by U.S. law through the middle of the twentieth century.24 Because physicians
typically do not negotiate fees in advance with patients, when, prior to
widespread insurance, physicians sued for fees, courts determined the implied
payment terms according to what the suing physician and others in the
community normally charged. Part of that calculation was the accepted
practice, prior to widespread insurance, of charging sliding-scale fees based on
ability to pay.25 Almost all of this litigation focused on whether physicians could
charge more to wealthier patients,26 but implicitly courts also required
physicians to charge poor patients less.
This legal regime, which has gone virtually unnoticed for over half a century,
is truly extraordinary. Nowhere else has the common law enforced a highly

This understanding arose from the social order among the Roman nobility that regarded public service
as one of the duties of citizenship and that assumed that other nobles would reciprocate in kind with
their services, as the need arose. See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 187–89
(1962); ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 51–55 (1953);
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN
TRADITION 413–20 (1996). British barristers adopted the convention of voluntary honoraria rather
than contractual fees, in part in order to elevate their social and professional standing over solicitors
and attorneys. J.H. BAKER, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS
119 (1986). These legal characterizations were largely just formalities, however, in that both in England
and in ancient Rome, lawyers usually expected to receive their standard payment before they took a
case. Also, they sometimes could sue for payment on legal grounds other than ordinary contract, such
as quantum meruit (equity) or to enforce a sealed bond given in exchange for service. Id.
21. Thomas Percival, for instance, in his seminal Medical Ethics, carefully refers to physicians’
payments as “pecuniary acknowledgements” rather than as fees, charges, or the like. PERCIVAL, supra
note 19, at 39–40, 174–79.
22. Lawyers never fully adopted this part of the creed. Instead, the practice among barristers was
to insist on payment of their usual fee in advance, before taking on a case. Only in criminal cases were
barristers required to work without pay. This prepayment practice obviated the need to sue for fees,
which legal historians speculate made it convenient for barristers to adopt the non-enforceability
doctrine as a means of elevating their professional standing. Later, barristers used the noncontractual
basis of legal services to argue for immunity from tort liability. See Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C.
191 (H.L. 1967) (appeal taken from Eng.), overruled by Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, (2000) 3 Eng.
Rep. 673 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
23. KENNETH ALLEN DEVILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
184 (1990); ORDRONAUX, supra note 19.
24. D.E. Evins, Annotation, Ability to Pay as Factor in Determining Reasonableness of Charge of
Physician or Surgeon, 97 A.L.R.2d 1232 (1964).
25. See, e.g., Zumwalt v. Schwarz, 297 P. 608, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (“[T]here is evidence of a
recognized usage, which has grown into a custom, to graduate professional charges with reference to
the financial condition of the patient . . . .”). One widespread practice was to charge the patient one
month of his or her salary for a major operation. Houda v. McDonald, 294 P. 249, 251 (Wash. 1930).
26. For instance, Citron v. Fields, 85 P.2d 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938), was a suit against the famous
actor W.C. Fields for $12,000 in medical fees.
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progressive pricing structure that requires service providers to cross-subsidize
people who cannot pay as much. From another vantage, however, this was not
extraordinary at all. Courts simply used prevailing professional practices and
ethical norms to fill in the unstated price terms of implicit service contracts.
Once written insurance policies usurped these implicit agreements, the legal
framework as well as professional practices quickly changed.27 Professional
ethics and public policy remain essentially the same, however. Physicians are
still encouraged to reduce or waive fees for patients who cannot pay,28 and
hospitals are expected to do the same in order to justify charitable tax
exemption. To make up the difference, they must charge somewhat more to
patients of means. Building these subsidies into provider pricing may be
economically inefficient, but, still, it is the progressive pricing system that is
encouraged by many health policy proponents.
B. Insurance Premiums
Regarding health insurance pricing, Havighurst and Richman emphasize the
regressive practice of charging lower-income subscribers the same as those with
higher incomes, even though the latter tend to use more health services in
similar circumstances, thereby taking disproportionate advantage of the
collectively purchased coverage.29 They suggest that if employers would
subdivide their insurance pools more or less by income class, individuals with
different needs and preferences could then purchase appropriate coverage and
pay more nearly for only what they get.30 Havighurst and Richman perceive
such regressivity even when employers offer their workers a variety of health
care options, because few employers require employees wanting higher-cost
coverage to pay its full incremental cost.31 The issue they identify has not been
much recognized, yet it is a potentially important one.
What Havighurst and Richman leave largely unexplored, however, is the
fundamental question of what constitutes regressivity in the pricing of private
health insurance. Lower-income workers tend to have poorer health and
greater health needs, necessitating consumption that offsets, at least in part, the

27. Although courts have not specifically repudiated the rule that considers patients’ ability to pay,
the last reported case following this principle is Spencer v. West, 126 So. 2d 423, 426–27 (La. Ct. App.
1960). The principle was briefly mentioned in one unreported case since then. Anticaglia v. Lynch, No.
90C-11-175, 1992 WL 138983, at *19 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 1992). Most modern cases simply state
that patients owe reasonable rates based on prevailing charges. E.g., Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke’s
Med. Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 980 F.2d 449, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1992).
28. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS Op. 8.055 (2005) (“Physicians
have a professional obligation to provide care to those in need, regardless of ability to pay, particularly
to those in need of urgent care.”); id. Op. 9.065 (“Each physician has an obligation to share in providing
care to the indigent . . . . Caring for the poor should be a regular part of the physician’s practice
schedule.”).
29. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 42.
30. Id. at 45–46.
31. Id. at 46–47.
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tendency that concerns Havighurst and Richman. In light of this difference in
health status, many believe that employers’ large, community-rated insurance
pools are more progressive than not. Havighurst and Richman, however, rely
mostly on evidence from Medicare and foreign health systems to suggest that
the net effect in most employment settings is still likely to be regressive.32 In
either event, the distributional effects of private health insurance merit further
discussion in this symposium.
In general, community rating is viewed as the most progressive way to price
private insurance because it charges healthier people more in order to subsidize
the costs of the sick.33 In contrast, under a social or governmental insurance
scheme, community rating would amount to a regressive “head tax” that
charged everyone the same regardless of their ability to pay. This difference in
perspective arises from the different assumptions that attach to private versus
public insurance. Even though a flat amount for each person is a highly
regressive form of taxation, this is the greatest extent of cross-subsidy that one
can reasonably hope for in private insurance pools that are formed voluntarily
through policies sold in a competitive marketplace.34 Still, such pooling
inevitably combines lower users with higher users, charging each the same
premium regardless of health. To the extent lower users also have lower
incomes, a form of regressivity exists that Havighurst and Richman hope to
avoid.
How this might happen depends on one’s source of insurance. The private
insurance market is divided between products that are and are not “medically
underwritten.”35 Insurers medically underwrite insurance that is purchased
individually or as part of a small employer group but not insurance purchased
through large employer groups. These two market divisions are governed by
entirely different economic principles and legal regimes.36 Large group
insurance is “experience-rated,” meaning that insurers—or employers in the
case of self-insured plans—estimate medical expenses for the group as a whole
based on historical trends and demographics rather than focus on the health
status of each member of the group. Because the extent of regressivity depends
on the context and the range of realistic options, these two market segments will
be considered separately.
1. Medically Underwritten Insurance
If lower-income people used fewer medical resources, insurers might be
expected to include income as a rating factor in their underwriting formulae.

32. Id. at 47–49.
33. See Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y &
L. 287 (1993) (stressing the social value of community rating).
34. See MARK A. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 62–76 (1994).
35. “Medical underwriting” means that insurers in some fashion assess and price the health risk of
each subscriber. Id. at 16–17.
36. Mark A. Hall, The Geography of Health Insurance Regulation: A Guide to Identifying,
Exploiting, and Policing Market Boundaries, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 173, 173.
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However, lower-income subscribers also tend to be less healthy on average and
therefore have more need to seek medical care.37 On balance, then, income
alone is not as strong a predictor of expected health care expenses as are other
available rating factors, such as age and prior use of health care services.
Therefore, the failure of insurers to adjust premiums for income is not due
primarily to regulatory barriers. 38 In most states, there are no legal obstacles
preventing insurers from adjusting insurance premiums for individual (“nongroup”) insurance according to subscribers’ income.39 More restrictions exist in
the small-group market, where states typically do not allow rating by income.
States tend, however, to exclude rating practices engaged in by only a minority
of firms and to allow those factors that most established insurers would prefer
to use.40 Therefore, it is unlikely that these regulations are blocking insurers
from using important rating factors other than individual health status.
This regulatory issue is largely beside the point, however, because
Havighurst and Richman do not actually advocate charging lower-income users
less for equivalent coverage.41 Instead, they would like to allow those who use
less health care, or who can only afford less, to purchase less coverage at a
lower price.42 In other words, they call for the separation of broad communityrated pools of comprehensive coverage into smaller pools consisting of more
widely differentiated coverage, allowing each pool to set its premiums according
to what is actuarially fair for that pool.43 This is in fact happening in the form of
high-deductible health plans that meet the federal requirements for taxprotected health savings accounts (HSAs).
If insurance policies have
deductibles that range from approximately $1000 to $5000 for single coverage
or $2000 to $10,000 for family coverage, then expenditures subject to the
deductible can be paid through a tax-sheltered savings account that excludes
contributions and earnings thereon from taxable income.44
These high-deductible plans are often priced as Havighurst and Richman
would want, at a level that reflects actual utilization of health care services by
their particular pool of subscribers.45 A purer, community-rated approach
37. John D. Graham et al., Poorer is Riskier, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 333, 334 (1992); Paula M. Lantz et
al., Socioeconomic Factors, Health Behaviors, and Mortality: Results from a Nationally Representative
Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 279 JAMA 1703–08 (1998).
38. Another possible explanation is that lower-income people are less likely to purchase insurance,
so insurers may consider that it is not worthwhile to add that factor into an already-complex rating
formula.
39. Insurance pricing is regulated by state, not federal, law. State law regulates small-group
insurance rating in much greater detail than the rating of individual (“non-group”) insurance. See
Mark A. Hall, The Structure and Enforcement of Health Insurance Rating Reforms, 37 INQUIRY 376,
376–77 (2001) (describing rating rules and practices for the small-group and individual markets).
40. See Mark A. Hall, The Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1992, at 108, 119 (discussing the insurance industry’s influence over market reforms).
41. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 49.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id. at 38 n.94.
45. Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health
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would distinguish the utilization-restraining effects of higher cost-sharing from
the “selection effect” resulting from healthier patients tending to choose leaner
and less-expensive coverage. In other words, according to the spirit of
community rating, lower costs due to cost-constrained use of services would
translate into lower premiums, but lower costs due to subscribers’ better health
would not. Seldom do regulators actually require insurers to make this
distinction, however. Instead, they allow insurers to price policies according to
the net utilization under each benefit structure, regardless of what drives the
utilization differences.46 As a result, if lower-income people were to select these
high-deductible policies disproportionately, they would not receive as deep a
discount as they might deserve. In effect, their poorer health status would
offset, at least to some extent, their cost-constrained demand for services. It
would be more progressive to give lower-income subscribers the benefit of their
lower demand for services without penalizing them for suffering poorer health.
However, it may not be feasible for insurers to make, or regulators to enforce,
this difficult actuarial distinction.
2. Employer Pools
So far, this overview has considered only insurance plans that are sold to
individuals or small employers, for it is only in these market segments that
insurers assess the likely costs of each potential subscriber. Within larger
employer pools, however, insurers calculate only the total costs for the entire
group based on recent utilization and leave to employers the decision of how to
allocate these costs across the workforce. 47 Legally, employers are largely free
to do what they want.48 Their decisions are influenced mainly by labor-market
economics, workplace equities, and practical administrative considerations.
The most visible way in which workers bear the cost of health benefits is
through the portion of the premium they are required to pay themselves if they
elect to receive health benefits.49 That portion is typically calculated as a simple

Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 413–14 (2005).
46. Id.
47. See MARK V. PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 86–91 (1997) (detailing the use of
community rating in allocating health insurance costs); W.E. Encinosa & T.M. Selden, Designing
Employer Health Benefits for a Heterogeneous Workforce: Risk Adjustment and Its Alternatives, 38
INQUIRY 270 (2001) (describing various options for employers to allocate health care costs among
employees).
48. As surveyed in Henry Greely, The Regulation of Private Health Insurance, in HEALTH CARE
CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND REGULATION 8-1 (Mark Hall ed., 1993), federal law preempts
much of this arena from state regulatory oversight and asserts little direct substantive regulation of its
own. Employers’ decisions to offer fringe benefits are affected indirectly by federal tax law, but tax law
does not require employers to provide equal benefits to all workers. Instead, unless they self-insure,
employers may favor some employees over others. RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 125–29 (2004).
49. As Havighurst and Richman discuss, economists argue that workers effectively pay for all
premium costs through reduced wages, because total payroll costs are constrained by market forces,
and employers are economically agnostic as to whether payroll expenses are paid in the form of wages
or benefits. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 44–45. Therefore, it largely does not matter how
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average cost per person in the workforce, without adjusting for health risk or
demographic factors—a method equivalent to pure community rating.
Employers could, but generally do not, charge lower-wage employees less for
equivalent coverage. 50 Some employers do, however, charge workers at least
somewhat less when they opt for lower-cost coverage, such as a Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO) policy rather than a traditional policy.
Thus, as employers begin to offer HSA-qualifying high-deductible plans, they
are free to, and usually do, charge less to employees who opt for this cheaper
coverage.51 Providing this lower-cost option moderates the regressive features
that Havighurst and Richman identify. Still, this is not as progressive as
employers conceivably could become.
One way employers might be even more progressive is to contribute more to
the HSAs of workers who would be more disadvantaged by high-deductible
insurance, such as those with chronic illness or those with lower wages. Federal
law prohibits this, however, by requiring that employers make equal
contributions to the HSA of each worker if they contribute anything at all.52
Insisting on strict uniformity most likely reflects a desire to avoid favoring more
highly compensated employees. Obviously, such a policy does not result from,
but rather is at odds with, a desire to be more generous to disadvantaged
employees. Therefore, it would make sense from a progressivity standpoint to
amend this uniformity requirement accordingly.53
A similar strategy employers could use to make consumer-driven health
insurance less regressive is to lessen the cost-sharing elements for lower-income
workers. Instead of either providing low-wage workers less generous insurance
that is less expensive or charging these workers less for equivalent coverage,

much of compensation goes toward health insurance. This argument is most convincing, however, only
for aggregate payroll costs. The economic effects of allocating these costs among classes of employees
remain more speculative. As Havighurst and Richman argue, it remains unproven whether having
lower costs for the health benefits of one subset of workers would result in higher wages for those
workers or whether the opposite would be true. Id. at 46. For instance, employers generally do not pay
some equally qualified workers more simply because they elect not to receive health benefits.
Therefore, it is relevant to focus on the portion of premiums charged explicitly to workers.
50. See Thomas Rice & Kenneth E. Thorpe, Income-Related Cost Sharing in Health Insurance,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1993, at 21, 21 (recommending that employers tie cost-sharing to employees’
income level); see also Veronica Goff, Consumer Cost Sharing in Private Health Insurance: On the
Threshold of Change, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM ISSUE BRIEF, May 2004, at 8, available at
http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/ IB798_CostSharing.pdf; Sally Trude & Joy M. Grossman, Patient CostSharing Innovations: Promises and Pitfalls, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE ISSUE BRIEF,
Jan. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/643/.
51. Gary Claxton et al., What High-Deductible Plans Look Like: Findings from a National Survey
of Employers, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-434, W-439.
52. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980G (2003); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, HSA Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/faq_basics.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
53. Recently, President Bush proposed allowing employers to make higher contributions to the
HSAs of chronically ill employees. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, State of the
Union: Affordable and Accessible Health Care (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2006/01/20060131-7.html. This proposal does not include different contributions based
on income, however. Currently, this can be done only through a “section 125 cafeteria plan,” also
known as a flexible spending account. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 52.
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employers could charge lower-income workers the same as others but provide
them more generous coverage that reduces their net out-of-pocket expenses.
This could be done in the form of equivalent insurance that has lower, although
still high, deductibles. One reason lower-income people use health benefits less
is that any given deductible or copayment is a greater deterrent to their seeking
care than it is for those with more money to spare—a phenomenon that
economists refer to as a “wealth effect.” The wealth effect is a major reason
lower-income people use health insurance less and is therefore a major
contributor to the regressive effect that Havighurst and Richman critique.
Adjusting deductibles or copayments to compensate for the wealth effect is
conceptually a relatively simple fix for the problem and one that appears to be
legally permissible. 54
In sum, in the complex world of health insurance regulation and employersponsored health insurance, few laws actually restrain insurers and employers
from adopting more progressive insurance-pricing practices.55 Instead, as
Havighurst and Richman thoroughly document, plenty of legal and regulatory
features artificially and inefficiently increase the overall costs of health care,
thereby exacerbating the extent of regressivity that tends to exist naturally.56 If
those larger problems were solved, however, there would be few legal barriers
to making the financing of private insurance more progressive. Indeed, highdeductible health insurance holds some prospect for both reducing overall
medical costs and offering more affordable coverage for lower cost.
III
LESS EXPENSIVE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
Havighurst and Richman’s primary concern is the employer-based tax
subsidy, which induces overly generous health insurance and thus excessive
health care consumption. Accordingly, their main remedies are aimed at
allowing patients, if they choose, to receive a substantially less expensive—and
presumably lower overall—standard of medical care than is currently required
by contract or tort law.57 This same legal dilemma was posed previously by
managed-care insurance, but for reasons thoroughly explained elsewhere, the
managed-care movement never substantially changed medical standards of

54. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 52. This would comply with requirements for HSAs
so long as the lowest deductible meets the HSA floor. For example, employers could give low-wage
workers coverage with a $1000 deductible while giving high-wage workers coverage with a $5000
deductible—each group being charged the same amount for their coverage. The only constraint set by
HSA law is that if the employer contributes to the HSA, it must contribute equal amounts for each
employee and no more than the deductible amount. See supra text accompanying note 52. Therefore,
under this example, employers could fund only one-fifth of the deductible for higher-wage workers.
55. The most notable example is the nondiscrimination requirement for employer contributions to
HSAs, which poses a regulatory barrier to implementing these new benefit structures in a way that does
not overburden lower-income workers.
56. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 58–71.
57. Id. at 66.
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care.58 Therefore, the academic debates over whether law could and should
allow these changes proved to be largely moot.59 Health policy is now looking
to consumer-driven ideas to force more of the kind of health care resource
allocation that has been minimized for the past half-century.60 If these new
forms of insurance take hold, they will squarely raise whether providers legally
may, on account of the cost, render medical services that are “substandard” in
some sense or that sacrifice some substantial measure of medical benefit.
As Havighurst and Richman demonstrate, many aspects of law require
similar—or even uniform—standards of medical care.61 These laws developed
over the past few decades when uniform comprehensive insurance prevailed
and lack of insurance was an exception that law could accommodate without
needing to vary basic legal standards.62 In the consumer-driven era of highdeductible health insurance, however, limitations in insurance will become
much more widespread. Most patients with high-deductible policies will pay for
most of their treatment costs out of pocket because most people’s annual
medical expenses will not exceed the high-deductible threshold.63 When entirely
out-of-pocket payment becomes commonplace, will the law continue to insist
on similar medical care for everyone? Thoroughly exploring this broad
question would require delving into many areas of legal doctrine. Here, space
permits a brief survey of only two of the most prominent issues: first, the
contractual standard of medical necessity and, second, the tort liability standard
of care.
A. Contractual Medical Necessity
There is no strong reason to expect that consumer-driven health care
(CDHC) will produce substantial changes in the contractual definition of
medical necessity. The thrust of CDHC is to retain standard insurance for
“catastrophic” expenses that exceed amounts for which most people are able to
58. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished?—A Foreword, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Autumn 2002) (introducing this symposium discussing the failed potential
of managed care).
59. Naturally, it is possible that managed care failed to drive substantial change because law was
not more conducive to change, but most observers believe that managed care’s failures were marketdriven or were related to federal tax policy. See Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A
Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 427 (2005) (detailing the reasons for the downfall
of managed care). Therefore, the extent of legal resistance was never seriously tested in many arenas.
See generally PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE
MANAGED CARE ERA (2002) (analyzing legal responses to various aspects of managed care).
60. See text accompanying supra notes 2–4.
61. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 63.
62. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical
Development and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L., MED., & ETHICS 141 (1993).
63. See Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving Managed Care with Health Savings
Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1491 (2005) (documenting the highly skewed distribution of health
care spending that produces this phenomenon). It is also the case, however, that most medical
expenditures will still be insured. This apparent paradox is explained by the fact that the minority of
people who exceed their deductible will have medical costs far above average, due to the highly-skewed
distribution of medical problems across the population. Id. at 1494.
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budget on an annual basis.64 Below that threshold, people are expected to make
their own decisions about what is medically necessary. Above the threshold,
insurers’ coverage decisions will be subject to essentially the same legal
oversight and market forces that currently prevail. Under managed care, there
were forceful arguments that insurers should and would enforce more stringent
cost-effectiveness standards,65 but this did not come to pass. If the basic
contractual standards of medical necessity did not materially change under
managed-care insurance, this change is certainly not likely to happen under
consumer-driven health insurance, particularly as managed-care restrictions are
loosened. The basic philosophy of CDHC is to reduce insurer oversight of
medical-care delivery and place most decisions in the hands of patients and
their physicians. This goal is not advanced by greatly tightening the
conventional definition of medical necessity. Moreover, insurers are generally
averse to reformulating their contracts and actuarial calculations to incorporate
new legal concepts that have not yet been tested in court. Innovating insurers
bear the risk of any legal setbacks or financial miscalculations, but any successes
in establishing favorable law or addressing market problems can easily be
replicated by their competitors. This is not a recipe for fundamental or radical
change.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the meaning of “medical necessity” in
particular cases will evolve incrementally under high-deductible insurance
toward substantially more cost-conservative standards of care. This is true for
the following reasons. First, for treatment subject to the deductible, medical
necessity will be decided primarily by cost-sensitized patients in consultation
with their physicians. Accordingly, prevailing professional practices, to which
the contractual standard of medical necessity refers, will likely incorporate
much more cost-sensitized norms than is currently the case. When insurance
applies, these will become the same norms that insurers enforce, thus giving
insurers a broader base of support in actual clinical practice to apply costeffective standards of medical necessity.
64. See sources cited supra notes 2–4.
65. E.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 89–110 (1995); Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health
Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992). Although this failure to
innovate may be due in significant part to regulatory barriers, it may also be due in large part to the
important jurisprudential, relational, and expressive functions served by the standard medical-necessity
concept. See Kathy Cerminara, Dealing with Dying: How Insurers Can Help Patients Seeking LastChance Therapies (Even when the Answer Is “No”), 15 HEALTH MATRIX 285 (2005); William M. Sage,
Managed Care’s Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative
Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 600–45 (2003). Health insurance contracts cover
complex professional judgments made in an almost infinite array of uncertain circumstances.
Therefore, they partake heavily of “relational contracting” features that are difficult or impossible to
specify in advance. In general legal theory, one solution is to contract for a broad existing professional
norm and to leave specification and application to largely noncontractual processes. See Symposium,
Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2000) (detailing various
applications of relational contract theory). This solution has prevailed under many types of health
insurance for half a century, and it is highly doubtful that consumer-driven insurance will suddenly
cause a radical change.
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Second, when disputes over insurance coverage are litigated, courts should
be less likely under consumer-driven plans to take such a harsh view of insurers’
or self-funded employers’66 motives for denying coverage. This point can be
appreciated by exploring the two different circumstances in which coverage
disputes likely will arise under high-deductible plans: when treatment is
covered by the deductible, and when it is not. Insurers will sometimes deny
medical necessity for expenditures that are entirely subject to the deductible
even though the insurer is not obligated in any event.67 This is because medical
necessity still determines whether these initial expenditures count toward the
deductible each year, and the deductible determines insurers’ responsibility for
costs above the deductible; therefore, insurers retain some stake in reviewing
medical necessity below the deductible. 68 It is likely, however, that such reviews
will be done retrospectively, after treatment, rather than requiring patients to
obtain permission first.69 In addition, patients will be paying for these services
regardless of the outcome of the dispute, so the dispute affects only the
insurer’s future contingent financial liability. Courts therefore should view
these coverage denials as mere determinations of financial responsibility rather
than as denials of actual treatment, in contrast to the view that prevailed under
managed-care insurance.70 This will lessen the pressure on courts to award
coverage as a means of giving patients every possible chance to receive
treatment that might work or that their doctors recommend.
Even when framed simply as financial disputes, older cases have tended to
strictly construe coverage language against insurers because of insurers’ selfinterest in avoiding financial liability.71 This strict scrutiny may abate somewhat
if courts moderate their view of insurers’ stakes under high-deductible plans.
When insurers deny medical necessity for treatment subject to a deductible, it is

66. Most of the points in this section regarding insurers apply as well to self-insured employers, to
the extent they make their own coverage determinations or review those made for them by contracted
insurance administrators.
67. These coverage denials will be less frequently appealed, however, because they will be for
lower-cost treatments and because many patients will be able to pay for them in any event from their
health savings accounts. Underscoring the latter point, the tax qualification of HSAs extends to a
broad list of health-related expenditures, regardless of whether they meet the stricter definition of
“medical necessity” in the accompanying insurance policy. See sources cited supra note 4.
68. Hall & Havighurst, supra note 63, at 1495.
69. Id.
70. For example, in Wickline v. State, the court reasoned:
The stakes, the risks at issue, are much higher when a prospective cost containment review
process is utilized than when a retrospective review process is used.
A mistaken conclusion about medical necessity following retrospective review will result in
the wrongful withholding of payment. An erroneous decision in a prospective review process,
on the other hand, in practical consequences, results in the withholding of necessary care,
potentially leading to a patient’s permanent disability or death.
192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1634 (1986).
71. See Mark A. Hall, Teresa R. Smith, Michelle Naughton & Andrea Ebbers, Judicial Protection
of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1055, 1063 (1996) (documenting legal factors in coverage disputes prior to widespread managed
care).
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primarily the patient’s money, not the insurer’s, that the insurer is attempting to
save. Such denials have only a possible impact on the insurer’s future liability if
the deductible is met later in the year. These factors are similar to ones that
previously have convinced courts to find no or a lessened conflict of interest.72
Under case law involving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)—which applies to employer-sponsored health insurance—the
insurer’s conflict of interest heightens the court’s scrutiny of the insurer’s
judgmental coverage decisions.73 When a conflict of interest is absent or lower,
courts defer more readily to insurers’ medical necessity decisions.74 The same is
true, at least to some extent, when state courts apply insurance contract law. 75
Under high-deductible health insurance, when treatment costs are below the
deductible, the insurer’s role is more akin to that of a “third-party
administrator” for an employer plan that is self-funded—that is, the insurer is
determining medical necessity as a contracted administrator rather than
determining its own immediate financial liability. When these same situations
arise under ERISA, courts consistently find no substantial conflict of interest in
the insurer. 76
More often, however, insurers with high-deductible plans will continue to
bear part or all of the immediate financial stakes when medical-necessity
denials are challenged. This is because appeals are more likely for denials with
larger financial stakes that exceed the deductible threshold, such as denials for
hospitalization costs. In such cases it is difficult to predict whether the judicial
view of insurers will moderate. It is possible, however, that courts will see these
situations as a hybrid between the situation just described (involving coverage
denials below the deductible) and the overt conflict of interest under
comprehensive, no-deductible insurance. For instance, a $10,000 claim under a
policy with a $5000 deductible would expose the insurer to only $5000 of
potential liability. If decided prior to treatment, a coverage denial might save
the patient and the insurer $5000 each.77 In analogous circumstances under
72. See, e.g., Crossman v. Media Gen. Inc., 9 Fed. App’x 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding no
conflict of interest when the employer paid benefits from a dedicated trust fund); Mers v. Marriott Int’l
Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no
conflict when the amount at stake is small compared to total assets available); Mitchell v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 437 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding no conflict of interest when the employer paid
benefits from a dedicated trust fund); Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for
Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992) (ruling that a potential future benefit to the
decisionmaker is not sufficient to create a conflict).
73. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989).
74. See generally Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases,
50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083 (2001); Peter A. Meyers, Discretionary Language, Conflicts of Interest, and
Standard of Review for ERISA Disability Plans, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 925 (2005).
75. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 65.
76. See cases cited supra note 72. Leading cases also include Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383–84 (3d Cir. 2000) and Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556,
1561–62 (11th Cir. 1990).
77. Alternatively, an insurer might deny coverage because a different type of effective treatment is
available that is substantially less costly yet still expensive. If the alternative treatment still costs as
much as the deductible, however, then the insurer would enjoy all the benefits of the denial, increasing
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ERISA, the court’s level of scrutiny moderates following an explicitly slidingscale level of review that varies according to the extent of conflicted interest.78
Viewing medical necessity determinations as entailing overlapping sets of
interests, it is conceivable that courts might regard coverage denials as mutually
beneficial attempts by insurers to make the best use of both the patient’s and
their own funds.
B. Liability Standard of Care
As consumers buy more-limited insurance and insurers enforce those limits
more aggressively, physicians will more frequently face the dilemma of treating
patients whose insurance does not fully cover what physicians believe is
medically optimal. The above section explains that deficits in coverage can
arise from two directions: If insurance has high deductibles, most subscribers
will pay for all of their treatment costs either out of pocket or from their
designated savings accounts.79 Even when insurance applies, insurers might
agree to cover fully only a less expensive version of treatment than the one the
physician believes is best, such as a generic rather than a newly patented drug or
an ultrasound rather than a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan. These
scenarios raise the question whether a physician is potentially liable if he
delivers treatment that is less than optimal, assuming the patient can later show
that the better treatment would have produced a better health outcome.
Medical law does not provide a clear answer to this question. In considering
whether liability law should accommodate cost burdens, previous discussions
have focused primarily on more extreme cases in which non-covered treatment
is extraordinarily expensive or patients have few or no financial resources.80
These are critical situations, but these extremes will not occur as often as the
more routine, but still challenging, situations presenting a range of treatment
options—all of which are at least somewhat affordable—the best of which cost
substantially more than the others.
Full analysis of this situation is complex, so in the space available here it
helps to make these simplifying assumptions: (1) the patient could pay for the
medically-optimal treatment if he or she felt the benefits were worth the extra
costs, (2) the patient was aware of the more expensive option and its advantages
but agreed to the less expensive course,81 and (3) most other physicians would
its financial conflict of interest. It is for this reason that Clark Havighurst and I propose that insurers
share some portion of the savings with the patient in such circumstances—for instance, by agreeing to
pay for the more expensive option if the patient will pay half the difference in cost. See Hall &
Havighurst, supra note 63, at 1498.
78. See cases cited supra note 72.
79. As explained earlier, this is true even though most treatment costs will still be covered by
insurance because insurance will primarily cover the relatively fewer situations of “catastrophic” costs
that exceed the high deductible, such as hospitalizations of more than just a few days. See supra note 4
and accompanying text.
80. E.g., Hall & Anderson, supra note 65.
81. In other words, this analysis purposefully avoids the informed consent aspects of the issue, such
as who should raise the question of cost in considering treatment options and how cost issues should be
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likely use the more expensive treatment with a fully insured patient under
similar medical circumstances. Given these assumptions, the less expensive
treatment is not clearly within the existing “standard of care,” so there is a
colorable claim that it is substandard.
Framed just this way,82 it is open to debate whether physicians would be
legally safe in delivering the less expensive treatment. In general, the medical
malpractice standard of care does not vary according to a patient’s insurance or
financial situation.83 Moreover, if care is substandard, a waiver of medical
liability is generally not enforceable due to the fiduciary nature of treatment
relationships.84 These legal positions have been developed, however, under a
highly polarized framing of the issues, such as fully insured versus indigent
patients or full liability versus complete waiver of liability.85 Limited-coverage
insurance does not typically pose these extremes. Instead, the legal issues can
be framed in more qualified terms such as the following:
(1) Are there any resource-sensitive components of the legal standard of
care, and if so, how well do they take account of patients’ willingness
to pay?
(2) If patients knowingly accept substandard treatment on account of
costs, do physicians have any defenses to liability, or do they have to
offer minimally acceptable treatment regardless of patients’
willingness to pay?
These are complex questions that can be viewed from a variety of doctrinal
perspectives, only some of which are briefly considered here. On the first
question, malpractice law takes financial resources into account in only limited
ways that do not directly recognize the financial circumstances of individual
patients or their willingness to pay.86 Legal scholars have advanced strong
discussed between patient and physician. For analysis of this issue, see E. Haavi Morreim, HighDeductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1207 (2006).
82. This precise combination of legal and medical attributes may not be the most common scenario
in which liability issues will arise under consumer-driven insurance, but this particular framing helps to
focus squarely on the legal issues that are uniquely raised by this form of insurance. See also id.
(framing and analyzing the issues similarly).
83. For older authorities, see Becker v. Janiski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1891), and
Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth-Century America, DEVILLE, supra note 23, at 183. For a modern
analysis, see E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1719, 1724–25 (1987), and John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice
Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439, 441 (1991).
84. Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 448 (Cal. 1963); Maxwell J.
Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care
Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 401–14 (1990); A.M. Swarthout, Annotation, Validity and
Construction of Contract Exempting Hospital or Doctor from Liability for Negligence to Patient, 6
A.L.R.3D 704 (1966).
85. See, e.g., President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(rejecting complete immunity for charitable hospitals).
86. James H. Henderson & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on
Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1403 (1994) (noting that courts
“covertly” adjust the standard of care to resource-dependent professional customs); see also Hall v.
Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872–73 (Miss. Ct. App. 1985) (considering resources in determining which
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arguments for and against varying the standard of care based on type of
insurance,87 but few courts have ever ruled on these arguments.88 They therefore
remain almost entirely a matter of academic debate.89 Most convincing is the
argument, made independently in various forms by several different scholars,
that malpractice law should distinguish between two components of the
malpractice standard of care: (1) deliberate decisions about how much
treatment to give a patient (the resource component) and (2) the skill with
which diagnoses are made and treatment is rendered (the skill component).90
Currently, the standard of care lumps together these two different components
of resources and skill and asks only whether the treatment received was up to
par. Legal scholars reason, consistent with general principles from case law,
that although the skill component should not vary by patients’ financial
circumstances, the resource component should. Otherwise, law would demand
more of physicians than is reasonable in the circumstances.91 Whether courts
will accept this reasoning remains to be seen.92
localities are similar).
87. See generally MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, MEDICAL
LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 324–25 (2005) (surveying various authorities).
88. Courts have not faced this issue for several reasons. One is that defense lawyers are reluctant
to raise resource constraints as a defense because financial motivation for substandard care would
likely be used by plaintiffs as a sword, even to the extent of justifying punitive damages. Id. at 325–26.
Another is that medical practices in HMOs or other resource-constrained settings do not in fact vary
much from full-payment settings. See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID
ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 220–21 (2005)
(reviewing empirical studies of HMO impacts).
89. Research has turned up only two cases broadly on point. One suggests financial resources
should matter and the second holds they should not. Compare Moss v. Miller, 625 N.E.2d 1044, 1051
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) with Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1384 (D. Mass. 1979), rev’d on other
grounds, Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980). Neither addresses patient cost-sharing. Instead,
they both consider care provided for free by institutions with limited budgets. The first case reversed a
defense verdict against a prisoner who alleged negligent failure to refer him to a specialist, reasoning
that the jury instructions improperly suggested that “those practicing the medical arts in the
penitentiary are held to [a different] standard of care.” Moss, 625 N.E.2d at 1051. The second case,
however, ruled in a challenge to conditions at a state mental hospital that it was “relevant . . . to
consider the medical resources and support facilities available” to the psychiatrists at the hospital in
determining whether they used psychotropic medication reasonably. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1384.
90. E. HAAVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE 80–82 (2001); Randall R.
Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Private
Options, 19 IND. L. REV. 857, 916 (1986); Mark A. Hall, Health Care Cost Containment and the
Stratification of Malpractice Law, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 501–08 (1990); Siliciano, supra note 83, at 482;
Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment, 103 YALE L.J.
1297, 1325–26 (1994).
91. See sources cited supra note 90.
92. Some support can be found in Hall v. Hilbun, which held that the skill component is uniform
but that the resource component varies by similar locality. 466 So. 2d 856, 872 (Miss. Ct. App. 1985);
see also Primus v. Galgano, 329 F.3d 236, 241 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that it is permissible to consider
local resources as a relevant circumstance in determining the standard of care under a uniform national
standard); Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968) (same). Support is also found in a
federal statute that adjusts the standard of care according to whether treatment is consistent with
Medicare payment guidelines while still requiring physicians to “exercise[] due care.” 42 U.S.C. §
1320c-6(c) (2000); see Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice
Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 136–40 (Spring 1991) (discussing the statute); Leah S.
Crothers, Note, Professional Standards Review and the Limitation of Services, 54 B.U. L. REV. 931
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There is more legal authority addressing the second question—whether
patients’ informed acceptance of substandard care is a liability defense. Several
scholars argue that courts should enforce agreements by patients or their
representatives to lower the ordinary standard of care.93 They observe that
altering the standard of care differs from waiving liability entirely, which is
primarily all that courts have refused to do.94 The general tenor of this
scholarship, however, is that there is still little or no judicial support for this
more moderate position.95 This is too narrow a view of the case law. Again, the
distinction between deliberate resource decisions and general skill level is
critical. Courts are in fact hostile toward using contractual arguments to lower
the general skill standard below negligence to, say, gross negligence.96 However,
several lines of doctrine recognize patients’ ability to agree to lower the
resource standard of care. If patients refuse treatment entirely, withholding
care is not only legally permissible,97 it could constitute battery or false
imprisonment to insist otherwise. This accounts for the practice of honoring
patients’ demands to be discharged early from the hospital, even when it is
against medical advice (AMA). Frequently, these “discharges AMA” are
motivated by patients’ concerns about financial responsibility.98
Another way of stating this principle is that malpractice law recognizes
assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, and informed refusal of
recommended treatment is one form of express assumption of risk.99 The same
principle applies when a patient, rather than refusing treatment, opts for an
alternative form of treatment that is less expensive.
When there is
disagreement over whether the course of treatment is consistent with a

(1974) (same).
93. E.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal
Obstacles, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (Spring 1986).
94. Some courts have also refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate malpractice disputes, but
most courts have approved these. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 87, at 427.
95. See William H. Ginsburg, Steven J. Kahn, Michael C. Thornhill & Steven C. Gambardella,
Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice Liability, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (Spring 1986)
(reviewing relevant cases).
96. Id.
97. Note, though, that some courts require treatment refusals to meet legal standards of informed
consent. E.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906–07 (Cal. 1980) (requiring a physician to better
inform a patient of why she needed a cancer screening test that she refused on multiple occasions).
98. Z.Y. Aliyu, Discharge Against Medical Advice: Sociodemographic, Clinical and Financial
Perspectives, 56 INT’L J. CLINICAL PRACTICE 325 (2002); Patricia Green, Diane Watts, Sabrina Poole
& Vasant Dhopesh, Why Patients Sign out Against Medical Advice (AMA): Factors Motivating Patients
to Sign out AMA, 30 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 489 (2004); David B. Smith & Joel L. Telles,
Discharges Against Medical Advice at Regional Acute Care Hospitals, 81 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 212
(1991); Saul N. Weingart, Roger B. Davis & Russell S. Phillips, Patients Discharged Against Medical
Advice from a General Medicine Service, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 568 (1998).
99. E.g., Baxley v. Rosenblum, 400 S.E.2d 502, 508 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding assumption-ofrisk instruction when a patient, who also was a physician, refused a treatment option recommended by
his doctor). Other examples arise in cases of Jehovah’s Witnesses who refuse blood transfusions. See
generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, or
Assumption of Risk, Other than Failing to Reveal Medical History or Follow Instructions, as Defense in
Action Against Physician or Surgeon for Medical Malpractice, 108 A.L.R.5TH 385 (2005).
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reasonable standard of care, it is often the case that multiple standards of care
exist, some of which only a minority of physicians adhere to. Under the “two
schools of thought” or “respectable minority” doctrine, physicians are protected
if their practice is consistent with any acceptable standard of care, even if it is
not the preferred, best, or most widespread.100 However, these issues of
reasonableness and professional acceptance usually are given to the jury to
resolve, leaving physicians in jeopardy of unsympathetic or uninformed juries.101
One way to remove this uncertainty over the reasonableness of an alternative
school of thought is to show that the patient knew about the alternatives and
requested the course that was taken.102 Based on a patient’s informed choice,
courts have allowed alternatives that objectively are not at all accepted or
reasonable.103
One final possibility is that instead of declining more expensive treatment,
patients might insist on the best treatment but refuse to pay. When this
happens, the law is complex and sometimes unclear. The relevant legal
principles depend on whether the provider is a physician or hospital, on
whether treatment has not yet been initiated or is being ended, and on the
extent of medical urgency in a particular case.104 For some combinations of
these factors, there are few or no decided cases, so the legal framework is
uncertain. Still, several aspects of this complex doctrine allow physicians in
particular to refuse to treat patients who refuse to pay.105
IV
CONCLUSION
Havighurst and Richman catalogue many of the ways in which distributional
inequities in American health law and policy force people to pay too much for
health care and insurance. Their basic insight—that social injustice results from
requiring everyone to purchase the same level of care preferred by the
wealthy—is similar to the following point made by health economist Uwe
Reinhardt twenty years ago:
100. See James F. Blumsein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in Assuring Quality,
Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the Health Care Marketplace?, 11
ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 133–34 (2002) (discussing various ways in which the law accommodates
“medical pluralism”).
101. See, for example, the following account by a physician who was sued for following a
conservative approach to screening for prostate cancer, as recommended by national guidelines.
Daniel Merenstein, Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15, 16 (2004) (“The jury sent a message . . . that
they didn’t believe in the national guidelines.”).
102. Cf., e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 996 (2d Cir. 1987) (signing an informed consent
form for unorthodox cancer treatment created a jury question regarding patient’s assumption of risk).
103. See, e.g., id. at 993 (permitting jury to find that unorthodox treatment was acceptable despite
testimony that the practitioner was a “quack” and “one of the cruelest killers in the United States”).
104. See MARK A. HALL, IRA MARK ELLMAN & DANIEL S. STROUSE, HEALTH CARE LAW AND
ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 82–115 (2d ed. 1999) (summarizing the governing law).
105. Mathew Gregory, Hard Choices: Patient Autonomy in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment,
30 JURIMETRICS J. 483, 499 (1990); Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 U. GA.
L. REV. 511, 528–33 (1997).
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A remarkable and unique feature of American health policy has been its attempt to
accommodate simultaneously both the egalitarian and the libertarian theories of
justice in their extreme purity. No other nation in the industrialized West has been
quite so bold, or quite so naive, as to attempt that feat . . . . There appears to be a
casual link between schizoid thinking on the ethical plane and impotence at the level
106
of policy.

Unlike Reinhardt, however, Havighurst and Richman are less interested in
making health care truly progressive than in making it more efficient.
Correcting regressivity is more than just a pretext, however; it is a genuine
motivator for reform.
Although they refrain from definitive policy
prescriptions, they at least raise the possibility that both equity and efficiency
will be enhanced by moving toward consumer-driven health care, embodied
most straightforwardly in HSAs and high-deductible health insurance.
This survey reveals that although some legal risks would certainly be
encountered, there is enough room in regulatory policy and common-law
precedents to allow this to happen. Not all aspects of legal doctrine fully
embrace the principles of consumer-driven health care, but neither are there
obvious major obstacles. It has been half a century since the era when most
people paid for most of their medical costs out of pocket. Naturally, the law
that developed over these generations tended to take for granted the
widespread existence of third-party reimbursement and thus often avoided
confronting the economic tradeoffs that health care inevitably entails. Still, the
common law has not discarded its historical roots.107 It embodies in many ways
the basic principles that patients should not have to pay for more than they
receive and that patients of adequate means cannot expect to receive more care
than they are willing to pay for. This legal regime may or may not enforce
society’s concept of a fair system of health care finance and delivery, but it goes
a long way toward allowing the more limited forms of insurance and the less
costly standard of medical care that Havighurst and Richman believe many
consumers would prefer.

106. Uwe Reinhardt, Chapter 1, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 1, 8 (Frank A. Sloan, James Blumstein & James Perrin eds., 1986).
107. For instance, the leading case on a physician’s freedom to refuse patients is a century old.
Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (holding that a physician need not give any justification
for refusing to treat a patient who subsequently died). The core of medical malpractice doctrine
remains largely unchanged from the nineteenth century, other than the locality component of the
standard of care. See DEVILLE, supra note 23, at 206–14.

